THE
ROJAVAN REVOLUTION AND THE THIRD SYRIAN FRONT
Matt
White
March
7, 2016
The
Syrian cease fire that went into effect February 27, 2016 presents a fantastic
opportunity for the long-repressed and internationally forgotten Syrian Kurdish
population to secure the political freedoms and civil liberties for which they
have been fighting. Yet as a question of United States foreign policy, support
for the Syrian Kurds is an uneasily resolvable complex issue that pits
ideological altruistic support against greater strategic American interests in
the region with the longstanding and crucial American alliance with Turkey.
Under the leadership of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a semi-autonomous
independent confederation of three provinces, named Rojava, has developed in the
Kurdish populated regions in Syria amidst the chaos of the Syrian Civil War. The
fledgling democratic republic heralds principles of civil rights, liberty and
equality to a degree that exceeds that of many Western nations. However, the PYD
is strongly affiliated with the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an
organization that the United States has classified as a terrorist
organization. The United States has only recently started to offer minimal
support for the PYD in the greater fight against the Islamic State (ISIS), much
to the dismay of Turkey, who has at times viewed the PKK/PYD as the greater
threat.
Who
are the Syrian Kurds?
The
Kurdish population in Syria is most prominent in the northern provinces along
the Turkish border, primarily in the northeastern corner of Syria wedged between
Turkey and Iraq. An estimated 1.5 million Kurds live in Syria, accounting for 9%
of the Syrian population, or 5% of the total Kurdish population. The
majority-Kurdish lands in Syria are actually quite diverse, with significant
populations of Arabs, Assyrians, Turks, and Alawites, and in addition to the
majority Sunni Muslim Kurds, significant Christian and Yazidi populations. For
much of Syrian history, the Kurds were a suppressed population, many stripped of
citizenship, leaving a people without a country. Arab nationalism in Syria was a
motivation behind the outlawing of Kurdish people and place names, as well as
demonstrations of Kurdish culture. Just prior to the outbreak of the civil war
in 2011, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad began to initiate a series of reforms
to loosen restrictions on the Syrian Kurds, but the process was soon overtaken
by events. Then July 19, 2012, in order to consolidate his forces around his
strongholds, Assad pulled all Syrian government troops out of the Kurdish
provinces. This left the region with de facto autonomy. Local leaders declared
the autonomous democratic region of Rojava, or the Autonomous Regions of Afrin,
Jazira, and Kobanê.
Though the provinces of Rojava are diverse, with opposition parties competing
among Kurds, by far the most powerful governmental entity in Rojava is the
Democratic Union Party (PYD). Illegal when it was formed in 2003, the PYD was
already a powerful, organized body at the start of the civil war, which enabled
it to easily assume control of the region after the Syrian government withdrew.
The PYD already controlled its own militia, the YPG, along with the all-female
Women’s Defense Units (YPJ), which were formed by the PYD Central Coordinating
Committee in 2007. The People’s Council of Western Kurdistan (PCWK), a
320-member elected assembly formed by the PYD December 12, 2011, assumed
municipal administrative responsibility of Rojava, functions that otherwise
would have been performed under Assad’s government.
The
PYD considers itself to be a total grassroots self-administering citizen run
pluralist democracy, and equates gender equality as a requirement for a
democratic existence. Salih Muslim has been the party leader since 2010. In
2014, Salih Muslim officially declared Rojavan autonomy, complete with a
constitution. The constitution, called
The Social Contract, is liberal, populist and pluralist to a fault. As
expected in any liberal democracy, religious freedom, freedom of speech,
assembly, and human rights are protected. Not only are the minority populations
constitutionally protected, as is the case in other Middle Eastern
constitutions, but they are constitutionally celebrated. Most unique, Article 87
of The Social Contract stipulates
that “All governing bodies, institutions and committees shall be made up of at
least forty percent (40%) of either sex.” As such, while the male Salih Muslim
is the acknowledged party head, the PYD has been officially co-chaired by the
female Asiyah Abdullah since 2012.
From
the preamble to the Social Contract:
Social Contract - the Constitution of Rojava
Support for the PYD from the United States is a much more complex issue than blindly backing a pro-Western democratic government with shared Western values. The PYD considers Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as its spiritual founder. Turkey sees the PYD as an extension of the PKK, and located right across the Turkish border, as a major threat. The PKK has been classified as a terrorist organization by both the United States and Turkey. Indeed, since the founding of the party by Öcalan in 1978, acts of terrorism caused by the PKK and confrontations with Turkish forces have resulted in an estimated cumulative 40,000 deaths on both sides through the start of 2015. Öcalan was captured in 1999 with the indispensable help from the United States, imprisoned, and sentenced to life. After peace negotiations that began in 2013 failed, terrorist acts have resumed.
This
begs the question, of just who is the PKK, and their revered leader Abdullah
Öcalan? Öcalan embraces the political philosophy of democratic confederalism, a
philosophy that Öcalan has relentlessly preached and written about before and
after his 1999 arrest. The democratic confederalism of Öcalan rejects capitalism
and the notion of the nation-state. From his point of view, Turkish and Arab
nationalism have only served to discriminate against and suppress the Kurdish
populations in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria. Öcalan’s democratic confederalism is a
form of communalism, a confederation of self-governing democratic communities as
democracy in its purest form, similar to what is seen in Rojava. Feminism,
environmentalism, and religious and ethnic equality are indispensable components
of the philosophies of both the PYD and PKK. The PKK has been a staunch
supporter of the PYD. After the PYD was excluded from the Geneva II conference
in 2014, the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), the practical
implementation wing of the PKK, released a statement, lauding, “…the Rojava
Revolution, with its libertarian and democratic character, offers hope for all
the peoples of Syria. The revolution of the Kurds in Syria, prefigures a
democratic system in which all peoples and religious groups can live freely.”
Yet,
in order to achieve their democratic ideology in Turkey, the PKK has resorted to
militant tactics. In 2011, on the 34th anniversary of the party’s
founding, the PKK Executive Council issued:
“Today the people of Kurdistan who were threatened and bullied with policies of
massacre, oppression, torture, genocide and assimilation are in a period of
great resistance to form democratic autonomy and defend their gains by staging
uprisings and supporting their guerilla forces…Furthermore, we are calling on
the brave women of Kurdistan and its heroic youth to undertake the most
honorable duty by joining the guerilla forces and leading the uprisings during
this historical period.”
While
the PKK may be labeled under the same umbrella as a terrorist organization, it
is crucial to distinguish between the wildly divergent philosophical motivations
of the PKK and Salafist Islamist groups such as ISIS and al-Nusra in Syria.
Öcalan’s democratic confederalism and the establishment of an Islamist caliphate
are completely mutually exclusive ideals.
Rojavan Regional Relations
Turkey has seen Rojava, under the PYD, as a safe haven for the PKK, and even above ISIS, as its greatest threat across the southern border. Turkey has backed Syrian opposition forces infiltrated with Islamist fighters, but not the PYD. With Turkey as the United States’ stronger regional interest and alliance, until recently, the United States has followed Turkey’s lead and for a time refused to provide any assistance to the PYD. Twice, the United States denied Salih Muslim a visa, preventing him from visiting with leaders in Washington after an invitation from the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, even after the United States lavished praise for the PYD for repelling ISIS to end the siege of Kobanê.
The
PYD has had tense relationships with other Syrian opposition forces, and other
Kurdish forces supported by the United States in the fight against ISIS. In
2012, president Barzani of the KRG formed the Kurdish National Council (KNC)
with the goal of uniting various Kurdish factions in their fight against ISIS.
Of eleven parties represented at a conference in the KRG capital of the Erbil,
the PYD was the only Kurdish party to boycott. Despite the fact that the PKK has
used the KRG as a refuge across the eastern Turkish border, economic and
security ties between Turkey and the KRG have been strengthened in recent years.
The Turkish-KRG relationship has alienated the PYD from the KRG, further
fracturing Kurdish unity. Further complicating PYD relations with the United
States, the KRG is a strong American ally. The KRG owes its existence to the
United States, with de facto autonomy following the enforcement of the no-fly
zone after the Gulf War, and official autonomy following the 2003 invasion of
Iraq and the imposition of a new U.S. supported Iraqi constitution, which
recognizes Kurdish autonomy through the KRG.
The
PYD is not a member of the coalition forces fighting Assad. Since 2012, when the
Syrian government withdrew from the three provinces that would form the Rojava
confederation, the PYD and Assad have held an unofficial truce. The PYD’s only
fight is against ISIS, al-Nusra, and other Islamist groups threatening the
Kurdish regions. Though the Rojavan
Social Contract invites other Syrian provinces to join Rojava under the
Contract’s principles, it also
upholds the integrity of Syrian borders, and while maintaining autonomy under
confederated Cantons, does not aim at overthrowing Assad or non-confederated
provinces. This has placed the PYD in direct opposition to the American and
Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other opposition forces fighting
Assad, and potentially into the sphere of Russian influence.
Policy Developments and the Syrian Cease Fire
During the October 2014 siege of Kobanê, the United States provided airstrikes against ISIS targets surrounding Kobanê, and airdropped medical supplies, small arms, and ammunition to the besieged Kurdish forces, at the disapproval of Turkey. Once Russia entered the equation, the United States resumed reaching out to the PYD, not only as one of the most formidable fighting groups against ISIS, but also among fears that Rojava could become a client state of Russia, in Russia’s support of the Assad regime. A resupply airdrop to the PYD forces carried out jointly by the United States and Russia in October 2015 provoked a strong rebuke from Turkish Prime Minister Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu warned that military supplies could end up in the hands of ISIS, but paramount were Turkish fears that weapons supplied to the PYD would end up being used against Turkey by the PKK.
November 14, 2015, the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), formed by
several countries through the auspices of the United Nations and the Arab
League, met in Vienna to develop plans for a proposed cease fire. This was
followed December 9 with a conference in Riyadh, with the United States, Turkey,
and most of the Gulf States facilitating talks with over one hundred
representatives of opposition groups. Though the PYD is among the most
prominent, formidable and organized parties in Syria, they were excluded from
discussions at Turkey’s insistence. In response to being left out of all talks,
the PKK organized the Rumeilan Congress in Rojava, inviting representatives from
the opposition forces, with the PYD as the host party. The objective was to
promote a moderate third party capable of intermediating between Assad and the
opposition.
December 18, 2015, the United Nations Security Council, in support of the ISSG
initiative, issued UNSC Resolution 2254. The resolution outlined terms for a
ceasefire that went into effect February 27, 2016. In the short term,
hostilities between Syrian government and opposition forces are to cease at the
borders of territories under current control by the various factions. In the
long term, the resolution calls for free elections and a new constitution.
Importantly, the resolution excludes ISIS, al-Nusra and other al-Qaeda
affiliated terrorist organizations, and urges both the government and opposition
forces to unify in their fight against these extremist groups. Erdoğan has
expressed outrage that the PYD has not been included in the list of terrorist
organizations excluded from the peace agreement, lumping the PYD in with ISIS
and al-Nusra.
Implications of US Support for Autonomy
UNSC
Resolution 2254 upholds “Syria’s unity, independence, territorial integrity, and
non-sectarian character, to ensuring continuity of governmental institutions…”
In this spirit of continuity, the question remains as to whether the United
States and other nations will recognize the autonomy, constitution, and
established government of the Rojava confederation, under the leadership of the
PYD.
One
option would be to appease Turkey and exclude the PYD from organizations
protected under the ceasefire resolution. With reason, Turkey greatly fears the
prospect of an autonomous and internationally protected Kurdish entity
contiguous along its southern border, associated with the PKK. Turkey is a more
crucial ally in the region to the United States than a small breakaway Kurdish
republic. Maintaining ties with Turkey in the name of American greater interests
in the Middle East, in this regard, would mean sacrificing a small, aspiring
liberal democracy, whose core philosophy is grounded on racial, religious, and
gender equality, and protecting human rights in general, rare in the Middle
East. Abandoning the Syrian Kurds would likely damage American relations with
the KRG in Iraq, a key ally in the fight against ISIS, which could lead to
further Iraqi destabilization.
If
the United States supports existing Rojavan autonomy without Turkey onboard,
tensions could escalate between Turkey and an empowered PKK, potentially leading
to armed conflict between Turkey and Rojava. The United States would have to
choose between a strong and powerful ally, against continuing support for a
fledgling democracy. Another approach would be for the United States and Turkey
to forcibly oust the PYD from power in Rojava, and to prop up the Rojavan
government with leaders acceptable to both the United States and Turkey,
individuals and parties without PKK affiliations. Such a move would not be
without historical precedent, yet, it would be contradictory to the principles
of democracy and autonomy championed in the Rojavan
Social Contract.
For
the Syrian Kurdish confederation of Rojava, the outcome of the Syrian peace
process and their continued autonomy oddly hinges on Turkey reaching a truce
with the PKK. A truce is not out of the realm of possibility. Neither Erdoğan
nor Davutoğlu are Kemalists, as both shun secular Turkish nationalism and its
minimalist view of Islamic religious values. Many in their ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) have embraced the Hizmet movement of Civil Islam, which
promotes Islamic virtue and piety expressed through democracy. Their biggest
concern is internal national security and stopping the wave of terrorist attacks
by the PKK. Though they have a reputation for taking a hard stance against the
Kurds, if it could result if the cessation of hostilities, in theory, Erdoğan
and Davutoğlu could have an easier time working with fellow Sunni Muslims than a
strong nationalist could in dealing with an ethnic minority. For one, in 2014,
Turkey announced that if the KRG became independent from Iraq, they would
recognize that Kurdish government, reversing a longstanding policy. As a part of
the peace process that began in the fall of 2013, alongside other Kurdish
groups, Erdoğan began a dialogue with the PKK and Öcalan from his prison cell.
Erdoğan proposed five modest reforms such as restoring private Kurdish-language
education and restoring Kurdish place names that had been changed to Turkish.
Concessions were unsatisfactory, and the peace process broke down.
If a
truce can be reached between Turkey and the PKK, with major concessions on both
sides through greater civil liberties and limited autonomy awarded to the
Kurdish Turks in return for cessation of PKK hostilities, then Rojava could
potentially become allied with Turkey. Should the Syrian peace process break
down resulting in a failed Syrian state largely under ISIS control, Turkish
military forces could concentrate on fighting ISIS, along its entire southern
border, including in defense of new ally Rojava, against the radical jihadist
organization that should be the real enemy. The current goal of the PYD is to
confederate Syria under its liberal democratic constitution, but if the rest of
Syria fails, the possibility exists that at some point, Rojava could become
incorporated under Turkish protection as an autonomous Turkish province. Such
overtures could strengthen the Turkish position for E.U. membership. For the
best possible outcome to unfold, American support for continued Rojavan autonomy
should be packaged with pressuring the PYD and PKK to clamp down on hostilities
in order to bring Turkey and the Kurdish representatives back to the peace
negotiating table.
Conclusion
Per
the ceasefire agreement that went into effect February 27, 2016, territory and
institutions held at the time of the ceasefire are to remain intact for the time
being, including the Kurdish-dominated confederated territories of Rojava. Yet,
the question remains: if the ceasefire is successful in halting the fighting
between the Syrian government and the opposition troops, would the United States
support continued autonomy for Rojava, along with military support for the
Syrian Kurds in the continued fight against ISIS and al-Nusra? The issue is much
more complex than face-value support for a fledgling liberal democracy. The
Rojavan democratic confederation is dominated by the PYD, a party strongly
associated with the PKK, which greatly complicates the matter as any stance
towards Rojava will reverberate throughout American-Turkish relations. The
ongoing multifaceted conflict in Syria is an issue likely to spill into the next
American presidential administration. For current officials and presidential
hopefuls, this struggle does not have to be a binary choice between taking the
altruistic moral high ground versus pursuing American greater strategic
interests by appeasing a powerful ally. For any American official to be
successful in pursuing a middle ground of support for Rojavan autonomy, while
not antagonizing Turkey, it would require a phenomenal level of diplomatic tact
and an intelligent understanding of all sides of the issue, attributes that
could be utilized towards the resolution of other longstanding conflicts
throughout the Middle East and beyond.
References
Balanche, Fabrice. “Syria’s Kurds Are Contemplating an Aleppo Alliance with
Assad and Russia.” The Washington Institute. October 7, 2015. Accessed February
28, 2016.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syrias-kurds-are-contemplating-an-aleppo-alliance-with-assad-and-russia.
British Broadcasting Corporation. “PKK attack kills soldiers in south-eastern
Turkey.” British Broadcasting Corporation. September 7, 2015. Accessed March 5,
2016.
[1]http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34169988.
Cagaptay, Soner, and Andrew J. Tabler. “The U.S.-PYD-Turkey Puzzle.” The
Washington Institute. October 23, 2015. Accessed February 28, 2016.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-u.s.-pyd-turkey-puzzle.
Carnegie Middle East Center. “The Kurdish Democratic Union Party.” Carnegie
Middle East Center. March 1, 2012. Accessed February 27, 2016.
http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=48526&reloadFlag=1.
Demirtaş, Serkan. “Turkey warns US, Russia over arms supply to Syrian Kurds.”
Hurriyet Daily News. October 14, 2015. Accessed February 28, 2016.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-warns-us-russia-over-arms-supply-to-syrian-kurds.aspx?PageID=238&NID=89820&NewsCatID=510.
Democratic Union Party of Syria (PYD). “Internal System: Rules and Procedures of
the Democratic Union Party (PYD).” Democratic Union Party of Syria (PYD).
Ratified September 21, 2015. Accessed February 27, 2016.
http://pydrojava.com/en/internal-system/.
Dobbins, James, Philip Gordon and Jeffrey Martini. “A Peace Plan for Syria. The
RAND Corporation. December 17, 2015. Accessed February 28, 2016.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE182/RAND_PE182.pdf.
Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK). “To Our Peoples and the Public!”
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). January 15, 2014. Accessed March 3, 2016.
http://www.pkkonline.net/en/index.php?sys=article&artID=216.
Gunter, Michael M. The Kurds: A Modern
History. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2016.
Hurriyet Daily News. “Keep PYD out of Syria truce deal:
Erdoğan.” Hurriyet Daily News. February 24, 2016.
Accessed February 28, 2016.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pyd-ypg-should-be-excluded-from-syria-cease-fire-process-erdogan-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=95635&NewsCatID=352.
Kömeçoğlu, Uğur. “Islamism, Post-Islam, and Civil Islam.”
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology
16. (March 2014): 16-32. Accessed November 14, 2015.
http://www.hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1393/ct_16_posting.pdf
Kurdistan National Congress. “Canton Based Democratic Autonomy of Rojava
(Western Kurdistan – Northern Syria): A Transformations Process From
Dictatorship to Democracy.” Kurdistan National Congress (KNK). May 2014.
Accessed March 2, 2016.
https://peaceinkurdistancampaign.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/rojava-info-may-2014.pdf.
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Executive Committee. “34th anniversary
of the Kurdistan Workers Party.” November 26, 2011. Accessed March 3, 2016.
http://www.pkkonline.net/en/index.php?sys=article&artID=175>.
Lund, Aron. “A Ceasefire in Syria?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
February 13, 2016. Accessed February 28, 2016.
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=62765.
Lund, Aron. “Riyadh, Rumeilan, and Damascus: All You Need to Know About Syria’s
Opposition Conferences.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. December 9,
2015. Accessed February 28, 2016.
http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=62239.
Öcalan,
Abdullah. Democratic Confederalism.
Cologne: Transmedia Publishing Ltd., 2011. Accessed from Freeocalan.org.
Accessed March 3, 2016.
http://www.freeocalan.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Ocalan-Democratic-Confederalism.pdf.
Reynolds, Michael A. “The Key to the Future Lies in the Past: The Worldview of
Erdoğan and Davutoğlu.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology no. 19
(September, 2015): 5-33. Accessed
March 1, 2016.
http://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/20150929CurrentTrends19.pdf
Richter, Paul. “U.S. denies Kurdish ally Salih Muslim’s request to visit.” Los
Angeles Times. January 30, 2015. Accessed February 27, 2016.
http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-us-denies-visa-request-from-ally-20150130-story.html.
Social Contract.
Constitution of the Autonomous Regions of Afrin, Jazira and Kobane. Accessed
from Peace in Kurdistan Campaign. Accessed February 27, 2016.
https://peaceinkurdistancampaign.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/english-version_sc_revised-060314.pdf.
Taşpinar, Ömer, and Gönül Tol. “Turkey and the Kurds: From Predicament to
Opportunity.” Brookings Institute:
US-Europe Analysis Series no. 54 (January 22, 2014): 1-12, accessed March 4,
2016,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/01/23-turkey-kurds-predicament-opportunity-taspinar-tol/turkey-and-the-kurds_predicament-to-opportunity.pdf.
Tharoor, Ishaan. “The Middle East’s alphabet soup of Kurds, explained.”
Washington Post. February 22, 2016. Accessed March 1, 2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/02/22/the-middle-easts-alphabet-soup-of-kurds-explained/?tid=a_inl.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015). December 18, 2015.
Accessed February 26, 2016.
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2254.pdf.