What Makes a Successful President?

 

 

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS: A CONSTITUIONAL MODEL OF ACHIEVEMENT

 

 

 

Matt White

April 7, 2015

 

Liberty University PPOG 624 – Presidential Leadership

 

Introduction

Presidential success can be measured in terms of the effectiveness of a president’s performance of the constitutional duties of the office and by the manner in which they are performed. The President of the United States is a multifaceted position of utmost responsibility. Due to individual strengths, some presidents can succeed in one presidential function while failing in another. Some analysts attempt to measure the success of a president by criteria such as public approval ratings, which are highly variable with time, or measured by the state of the nation before and after taking office, as if the president were the only agent of change. In contrast, by framing success around the constitutional duties, success can be more objectively measured, without partisanship, and more consistent over time. It is important that presidential success be framed within constitutional bounds, or harmful demagoguery can be mistaken for positive achievement.

Constitutional Keys for Presidential Domestic Success

 “He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient…”[1] All presidents enter office with a legislative agenda.            Presidential success can be measured by a president’s ability to work with Congress and to take leadership in the successful passing of such measures that he deemed necessary and expedient. Presidents who are successful in influencing Congress generally take advantage of their first 100 days in office while they have the most political momentum, and while they still have a clean slate in the public eye, a public positivity bias with the benefit of the doubt,[2] and are less subject to scrutiny.[3] Franklin Roosevelt was notorious in his legislative successes in the first 100 day period. It was originally unintentional, but when in the opening days of his presidency the Congress showed an unusual willingness to pass a few recommended emergency measures, Roosevelt took full advantage of this surprise influence to pass a remarkable amount of legislation in the opening months.[4] For a president to have success with Congress in the first 100 days, it is important that proposed policies are focused and prioritized.[5] In contrast to FDR’s success, Presidents Carter and Clinton were largely ineffectual in their initial dealings with Congress by presenting a long list of diverse proposals without coherent focus on one or two specific policy priorities.[6] Successful presidents are able to lead and influence public opinion. Congress will be more willing to back a president’s policies if the proposals are backed by public support.[7]

“…he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed…”[8] Successful presidents are successful in their ability to faithfully execute the law. In this capacity, the president is the head of the vast executive bureaucracy tasked with performing the administrative functions of the federal government, and success is largely dependent on the president’s administrative and organizational skill. A politician may know how to effectively campaign and may have a strong understanding of political philosophy, but this might not always translate into the practical applications of daily governance. It is common for presidents to lack attention to policy implementation upon entering office.[9] However as future president Woodrow Wilson opined in 1887, “We do not study the art of governing: we govern. But mere unschooled genius for affairs will not save us from sad blunders in administration.”[10] Success depends on an organized structure within the White House and Executive Office, with clearly defined open channels of communication. Micromanaging can be an impediment to administrative progress, but over-delegation can be just as damaging.

            It is important to note that success in carrying out their constitutionally prescribed duties of recommending and executing legislation, their authority is not exceeded by the actual unilateral creation of law. A president has the right to use discretion in performing administrative duties, but often, this discretion can essentially turn into legislation by executive decree if some laws are willfully unenforced, or when regulations are issued without legislative statute.[11] The system of constitutional checks and balances created by the founders is critical to preventing autocratic tyranny of one branch gaining undue power over the other. In the opposite regard, a successful president uses the power of the veto to hold a runaway Congress in check. As Hamilton argued in The Federalist 73, the veto “furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws.” Sending proposed legislation back to Congress has the advantage of further deliberation and scrutiny if a bad policy was hastily passed.[12]

Keys for Presidential Foreign Success

            “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States…”[13] While numerous presidents have served in the military, only a handful have entered the office with the experience of  high command. To be a successful commander in chief of the military during times of war, it is important for a president to heed the advice of his generals, yet be decisive in making independent decisions. It is critical to note that the founders deliberately vested Congress with the power to declare war, lest a power-hungry president come to office and abuse his military leader in personal conquests of glory.[14] However, during emergency situations and in defending the nation, a president must act swiftly and decisively if a president is to be a successful commander in chief.

            “He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties…”[15] Success in foreign policy can be more difficult to achieve than domestic political success, since treaties pursued must be forged with foreign leaders that are only after their own and not American self-interest. Presidential success in the diplomatic arena cannot be measured by the quantity of treaties enacted at the expense of American concession, rather than the quality of the required alliances needed to preserve American freedom. A key to successful diplomacy in this regard is a firm belief in right vs. wrong and avoiding appeasement of dictators based on the perceived convenience of a relationship. Ronald Reagan offered a striking success picture of how through diplomatic efforts, he influenced the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union. Much like Washington, Reagan saw the United States as the proverbial virtuous city on a hill and a beacon of democracy.[16] Reagan was unwavering in his stance on democratic moral virtue vs. the evils of communism as a philosophy, but maintained amicable relationships with Soviet leadership on a personal level.[17] His repeated calls to tear down the Berlin Wall and for foreign freedoms were widely received throughout the Eastern Bloc and they influenced the people to rise out from under Soviet Control.[18] This is in contrast to the treaties of détente issued by previous administrations that only served to perpetuate the status quo. 

The Dangers of Demagoguery

            Simply measured by the framework of constitutional duties, presidential success can be achieved through strong leadership and statesmanship, but also through demagoguery. Demagoguery can be a threat to personal liberty and lead down the path towards autocracy. The political ambition of a demagogue is founded on self-centered ego and a quest for personal power and glory, contrasted with a statesman, aimed at achieving a transcendent purpose beyond the self. A presidential demagogue can use personal charm, manipulation, and flattery to swap public opinion and congressional support in achieving a legislative agenda. However, success in passing legislation does not always result in good policy, as bad or poorly thought out policies can have negative unintended consequences. A demagogue can gain support by promising the public instant benefits, but at the expense of the longer term prosperity of the nation. A power-hungry demagogue can go beyond their constitutional authority in administering federal policy, essentially unilaterally creating legislation through executive order. A demagogue can successfully negotiate treaties and conduct diplomacy in ways to score immediate personal political points, but perhaps at the risk of longer-tern national security of ourselves or our allies. A demagogue can also ignore the constitutional fact that treaties are to be made not unilaterally, but with the advice and consent of the Senate. Perhaps most dangerous is a power-hungry or vengeful demagogue in command of the military, who authorizes the use of force without congressional approval, who is reckless and irrational in the conduct of war, or who is too eager to utilize the nuclear arsenal.

            The president is also constitutionally responsible for the nomination of ambassadors and public officers, and for filling the federal judiciary. A responsible president will nominate qualified individuals to those positions based on merit. However, a demagogue can nominate less qualified individuals, with the primary goal of filling vacancies with loyalists who will only serve to advance the president’s personal agenda.[19] In this role, demagoguery can be damaging, particularly in the nomination of Supreme Court justices, and the strength of constitutional democracy depends on the Senate’s willingness to block such nominations.

Neumann stated that “Even the greatest statesman depends to some extent upon the support of the masses and therefore must utilize some bit of demagoguery,”[20] however, presidents must proceed with caution in this regard in order to achieve true presidential success. The governing philosophy of the founders guided them in creating the system of checks and balances that would attempt to protect against the overreaching of power by any one branch, but history has shown that demagoguery has infected the presidency in varying degrees.

Biblically, Paul addresses the nature of demagoguery, instructing “Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit. Rather in humility value others above yourselves, not looking to your own interests by each of you to the interests of others.”[21] The founders understood that God is the author of all of our freedoms, and allows American liberty through his blessings. However, moral decline can pave the way towards falling under the thralldom of the demagogue and put our freedoms at risk. Ultimately, a truly successful president is one that serves the main purpose of American government: the protection of our God-granted liberty.

Conclusion

            The success and accomplishments of a presidency can be viewed within the framework of each of the separate executive duties outlined by the United States Constitution, including recommending legislation, executing the law, acting as commander in chief, and administering foreign policy. With these varying responsibilities, a president may succeed in areas of strength and fail in areas of weakness. However, it should be emphasized that presidential success must be measured in terms of accomplishments within legal and constitutional bounds. The foundations of American democratic principle are undermined by demagoguery, which leads towards the development of autocracy. A successful president ultimately leads with the sole transcendent purpose of American government as the end goal. That driving force is the protection of American life, liberty, property, and the blessings of God-granted freedom. In this, success can be framed by one common measure – the transcendental ability to protect the founding principles.

 


References

Cannon, Lou. President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. 1991. Reprint, New York: Public Affairs, 2000.

 

Edwards, George C. III and Stephen J. Wayne. Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making. 9th ed. Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2014.

 

Fisher, Louis. “The Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 12, no. 2 (February 2010): 569-591. Accessed March 29, 2015. http://goo.gl/Ygaf4G.

 

Ginsburg, Douglas. “Legislative Powers: Not Yours to Give Away.” First Principles Series, no.2 (January 6, 2011): 1-3. Accessed March 29, 2015. http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/CGL02.pdf.

 

Greenstein, Fred I. The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama. 3rd ed. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009.

 

Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, John Jay. The Federalist. Orig. pub. 1788, 1818. Project Gutenburg compilation, 1992. Accessed March 28, 2015. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/abt_fedpapers.html

 

Henderson, Phillip G. “Carter, Clinton, and the policy wonk presidency.” Perspectives on Political Science 26, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 149-156. Accessed March 29, 2015. http://goo.gl/uQEgWM

 

Neumann, Sigmund. “The Rule of the Demagogue.” American Sociological Review 3, no. 4 (August 1938). 487–498. Accessed March 18, 2015. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/stable/view/2083896.

 

Wilson, Woodrow. “The Study of Administration.” Political Science Quarterly (July 1887). Accessed April 4, 2015. http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primary-sources/woodrow-wilson-on-administration.

 

 

 



[1]. US Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3.

[2]. George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, 9th ed., (Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2014), 115.

[3]. George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, 9th ed., (Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2014), 349, 360

[4]. Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama, 3rd ed., (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 19.

[5]. Edwards and Wayne, 359-360.

[6]. Phillip G. Henderson, “Clinton, Carter, and the policy wonk presidency,” Perspectives on Political Science 26 no. 3 (Summer 1997): 149-156, accessed March 29, 2015, http://goo.gl/uQEgWM.

[7]. Edwards and Wayne, 346-347.

[8]. US Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3.

[9]. George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, 9th ed., (Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2014), 280-282.

[10]. Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” Political Science Quarterly (July 1887), accessed April 4, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primary-sources/woodrow-wilson-on-administration

[11]. Douglas Ginsburg, “Legislative Powers: Not Yours to Give Away,” First Principles Series, no. 2 (January 6, 2011): 1-3, accessed March 29, 2015, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/CGL02.pdf.

[12]. Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist, orig. pub. 1788, 1818, Project Gutenburg compilation, 1992, accessed March 28, 2015. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/abt_fedpapers.html.

[13]. US Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.

[14]. Louis Fisher, “The Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 12, no. 2 (February 2010): 573, accessed March 29, 2015, http://goo.gl/Ygaf4G.

[15]. US Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.

[16]. William B. Allen, “The Moral Foundations of  Political Choices: George Washington, Foreign Policy, and National Character,” Review of Faith & International Affairs 9, no. 4 (December 2011): 10, accessed March 29, 2015, http://goo.gl/za6Pkj.

[17]. Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama, 3rd ed., (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 153-155

[18]. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, (1991; repr., New York: Public Affairs, 2000), 695.

[19]. George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, 9th ed., (Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2014), 379.

[20]. Sigmund Neumann, “The Rule of the Demagogue,” American Sociological Review 3, no. 4 (August 1938): 487, accessed March 18, 2015, http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/stable/view/2083896.

[21]. Philippians 2:3-4 (NIV)