What Makes a Successful President?
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS: A CONSTITUIONAL
MODEL OF ACHIEVEMENT
Matt White
April 7, 2015
Liberty University PPOG 624 – Presidential Leadership
Introduction
Presidential success can be measured
in terms of the effectiveness of a president’s performance of the constitutional
duties of the office and by the manner in which they are performed. The
President of the United States is a multifaceted position of utmost
responsibility. Due to individual strengths, some presidents can succeed in one
presidential function while failing in another. Some analysts attempt to measure
the success of a president by criteria such as public approval ratings, which
are highly variable with time, or measured by the state of the nation before and
after taking office, as if the president were the only agent of change. In
contrast, by framing success around the constitutional duties, success can be
more objectively measured, without partisanship, and more consistent over time.
It is important that presidential success be framed within constitutional
bounds, or harmful demagoguery can be mistaken for positive achievement.
Constitutional Keys for
Presidential Domestic Success
“He
shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the
Union, and recommend to their consideration such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient…”[1]
All presidents enter office with a legislative agenda.
Presidential success can be measured by a president’s ability to work with
Congress and to take leadership in the successful passing of such measures that
he deemed necessary and expedient. Presidents who are successful in influencing
Congress generally take advantage of their first 100 days in office while they
have the most political momentum, and while they still have a clean slate in the
public eye, a public positivity bias with the benefit of the doubt,[2]
and are less subject to scrutiny.[3]
Franklin Roosevelt was notorious in his legislative successes in the first 100
day period. It was originally unintentional, but when in the opening days of his
presidency the Congress showed an unusual willingness to pass a few recommended
emergency measures, Roosevelt took full advantage of this surprise influence to
pass a remarkable amount of legislation in the opening months.[4]
For a president to have success with Congress in the first 100 days, it is
important that proposed policies are focused and prioritized.[5]
In contrast to FDR’s success, Presidents Carter and Clinton were largely
ineffectual in their initial dealings with Congress by presenting a long list of
diverse proposals without coherent focus on one or two specific policy
priorities.[6] Successful
presidents are able to lead and influence public opinion. Congress will be more
willing to back a president’s policies if the proposals are backed by public
support.[7]
“…he shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed…”[8]
Successful presidents are successful in their ability to faithfully execute the
law. In this capacity, the president is the head of the vast executive
bureaucracy tasked with performing the administrative functions of the federal
government, and success is largely dependent on the president’s administrative
and organizational skill. A politician may know how to effectively campaign and
may have a strong understanding of political philosophy, but this might not
always translate into the practical applications of daily governance. It is
common for presidents to lack attention to policy implementation upon entering
office.[9]
However as future president Woodrow Wilson opined in 1887, “We do not study the
art of governing: we govern. But mere unschooled genius for affairs will not
save us from sad blunders in administration.”[10]
Success depends on an organized structure within the White House and Executive
Office, with clearly defined open channels of communication. Micromanaging can
be an impediment to administrative progress, but over-delegation can be just as
damaging.
It is important to note that success in carrying out their
constitutionally prescribed duties of recommending and executing legislation,
their authority is not exceeded by the actual unilateral creation of law. A
president has the right to use discretion in performing administrative duties,
but often, this discretion can essentially turn into legislation by executive
decree if some laws are willfully unenforced, or when regulations are issued
without legislative statute.[11]
The system of constitutional checks and balances created by the founders is
critical to preventing autocratic tyranny of one branch gaining undue power over
the other. In the opposite regard, a successful president uses the power of the
veto to hold a runaway Congress in check. As Hamilton argued in
The Federalist 73, the veto “furnishes
an additional security against the enaction of improper laws.” Sending proposed
legislation back to Congress has the advantage of further deliberation and
scrutiny if a bad policy was hastily passed.[12]
Keys for Presidential Foreign
Success
“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the
actual service of the United States…”[13]
While numerous presidents have served in the military, only a handful have
entered the office with the experience of high
command. To be a successful commander in chief of the military during times of
war, it is important for a president to heed the advice of his generals, yet be
decisive in making independent decisions. It is critical to note that the
founders deliberately vested Congress with the power to declare war, lest a
power-hungry president come to office and abuse his military leader in personal
conquests of glory.[14]
However, during emergency situations and in defending the nation, a president
must act swiftly and decisively if a president is to be a successful commander
in chief.
“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties…”[15]
Success in foreign policy can be more difficult to achieve than domestic
political success, since treaties pursued must be forged with foreign leaders
that are only after their own and not American self-interest. Presidential
success in the diplomatic arena cannot be measured by the quantity of treaties
enacted at the expense of American concession, rather than the quality of the
required alliances needed to preserve American freedom. A key to successful
diplomacy in this regard is a firm belief in right vs. wrong and avoiding
appeasement of dictators based on the perceived convenience of a relationship.
Ronald Reagan offered a striking success picture of how through diplomatic
efforts, he influenced the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union.
Much like Washington, Reagan saw the United States as the proverbial virtuous
city on a hill and a beacon of democracy.[16]
Reagan was unwavering in his stance on democratic moral virtue vs. the evils of
communism as a philosophy, but maintained amicable relationships with Soviet
leadership on a personal level.[17]
His repeated calls to tear down the Berlin Wall and for foreign freedoms were
widely received throughout the Eastern Bloc and they influenced the people to
rise out from under Soviet Control.[18]
This is in contrast to the treaties of détente issued by previous
administrations that only served to perpetuate the status quo.
The Dangers of Demagoguery
Simply measured by the framework of constitutional duties, presidential
success can be achieved through strong leadership and statesmanship, but also
through demagoguery. Demagoguery can be a threat to personal liberty and lead
down the path towards autocracy. The political ambition of a demagogue is
founded on self-centered ego and a quest for personal power and glory,
contrasted with a statesman, aimed at achieving a transcendent purpose beyond
the self. A presidential demagogue can use personal charm, manipulation, and
flattery to swap public opinion and congressional support in achieving a
legislative agenda. However, success in passing legislation does not always
result in good policy, as bad or poorly thought out policies can have negative
unintended consequences. A demagogue can gain support by promising the public
instant benefits, but at the expense of the longer term prosperity of the
nation. A power-hungry demagogue can go beyond their constitutional authority in
administering federal policy, essentially unilaterally creating legislation
through executive order. A demagogue can successfully negotiate treaties and
conduct diplomacy in ways to score immediate personal political points, but
perhaps at the risk of longer-tern national security of ourselves or our allies.
A demagogue can also ignore the constitutional fact that treaties are to be made
not unilaterally, but with the advice and consent of the Senate. Perhaps most
dangerous is a power-hungry or vengeful demagogue in command of the military,
who authorizes the use of force without congressional approval, who is reckless
and irrational in the conduct of war, or who is too eager to utilize the nuclear
arsenal.
The president is also constitutionally responsible for the nomination of
ambassadors and public officers, and for filling the federal judiciary. A
responsible president will nominate qualified individuals to those positions
based on merit. However, a demagogue can nominate less qualified individuals,
with the primary goal of filling vacancies with loyalists who will only serve to
advance the president’s personal agenda.[19] In this
role, demagoguery can be damaging, particularly in the nomination of Supreme
Court justices, and the strength of constitutional democracy depends on the
Senate’s willingness to block such nominations.
Neumann stated that “Even the greatest
statesman depends to some extent upon the support of the masses and therefore
must utilize some bit of demagoguery,”[20]
however, presidents must proceed with caution in this regard in order to achieve
true presidential success. The governing philosophy of the founders guided them
in creating the system of checks and balances that would attempt to protect
against the overreaching of power by any one branch, but history has shown that
demagoguery has infected the presidency in varying degrees.
Biblically, Paul addresses the nature
of demagoguery, instructing “Do nothing out of selfish ambition or vain conceit.
Rather in humility value others above yourselves, not looking to your own
interests by each of you to the interests of others.”[21]
The founders understood that God is the author of all of our freedoms, and
allows American liberty through his blessings. However, moral decline can pave
the way towards falling under the thralldom of the demagogue and put our
freedoms at risk. Ultimately, a truly successful president is one that serves
the main purpose of American government: the protection of our God-granted
liberty.
Conclusion
The success and accomplishments of a presidency can be viewed within the
framework of each of the separate executive duties outlined by the United States
Constitution, including recommending legislation, executing the law, acting as
commander in chief, and administering foreign policy. With these varying
responsibilities, a president may succeed in areas of strength and fail in areas
of weakness. However, it should be emphasized that presidential success must be
measured in terms of accomplishments within legal and constitutional bounds. The
foundations of American democratic principle are undermined by demagoguery,
which leads towards the development of autocracy. A successful president
ultimately leads with the sole transcendent purpose of American government as
the end goal. That driving force is the protection of American life, liberty,
property, and the blessings of God-granted freedom. In this, success can be
framed by one common measure – the transcendental ability to protect the
founding principles.
References
Cannon,
Lou. President Reagan: The Role of a
Lifetime. 1991. Reprint, New York: Public Affairs, 2000.
Edwards,
George C. III and Stephen J. Wayne.
Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making. 9th ed.
Stamford: Cengage Learning, 2014.
Fisher,
Louis. “The Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power.”
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 12, no. 2
(February 2010): 569-591. Accessed March 29, 2015. http://goo.gl/Ygaf4G.
Ginsburg, Douglas. “Legislative Powers: Not Yours to Give Away.”
First Principles Series, no.2 (January 6, 2011): 1-3. Accessed March
29, 2015. http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/CGL02.pdf.
Greenstein, Fred I. The Presidential
Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama. 3rd ed.
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009.
Hamilton, Alexander, James
Madison, John Jay. The Federalist.
Orig. pub. 1788, 1818. Project Gutenburg compilation, 1992. Accessed March 28,
2015. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/abt_fedpapers.html
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Accessed March 29, 2015. http://goo.gl/uQEgWM
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Sigmund. “The Rule of the Demagogue.”
American Sociological Review 3, no. 4 (August 1938).
487–498. Accessed March 18, 2015.
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/stable/view/2083896.
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Woodrow. “The Study of Administration.”
Political Science Quarterly (July 1887). Accessed April 4, 2015.
http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primary-sources/woodrow-wilson-on-administration.
[1].
US Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3.
[2].
George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne,
Presidential Leadership: Politics
and Policy Making, 9th ed., (Stamford: Cengage Learning,
2014), 115.
[3].
George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne,
Presidential Leadership: Politics
and Policy Making, 9th ed., (Stamford: Cengage Learning,
2014), 349, 360
[4].
Fred I. Greenstein, The
Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama,
3rd ed., (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press,
2009), 19.
[5].
Edwards and Wayne, 359-360.
[6].
Phillip G. Henderson, “Clinton, Carter, and the policy wonk presidency,”
Perspectives on Political Science
26 no. 3 (Summer 1997): 149-156, accessed March 29, 2015,
http://goo.gl/uQEgWM.
[7].
Edwards and Wayne, 346-347.
[8].
US Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3.
[9].
George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne,
Presidential Leadership: Politics
and Policy Making, 9th ed., (Stamford: Cengage Learning,
2014), 280-282.
[10].
Woodrow Wilson, “The Study of Administration,”
Political Science Quarterly
(July 1887), accessed April 4, 2015,
http://www.heritage.org/initiatives/first-principles/primary-sources/woodrow-wilson-on-administration
[11].
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First Principles Series, no. 2
(January 6, 2011): 1-3, accessed March 29, 2015,
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/CGL02.pdf.
[12].
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, John Jay,
The Federalist, orig. pub. 1788, 1818, Project Gutenburg
compilation, 1992, accessed March 28, 2015.
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/abt_fedpapers.html.
[13].
US Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.
[14].
Louis Fisher, “The Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power,”
University of Pennsylvania Journal
of Constitutional Law 12, no. 2 (February 2010): 573, accessed March
29, 2015, http://goo.gl/Ygaf4G.
[15].
US Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2.
[16].
William B. Allen, “The Moral Foundations of
Political Choices: George Washington, Foreign Policy, and
National Character,” Review of Faith & International Affairs 9, no. 4 (December 2011):
10, accessed March 29, 2015, http://goo.gl/za6Pkj.
[17].
Fred I. Greenstein, The
Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama,
3rd ed., (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press,
2009), 153-155
[18].
Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime, (1991; repr., New York:
Public Affairs, 2000), 695.
[19].
George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne,
Presidential Leadership: Politics
and Policy Making, 9th ed., (Stamford: Cengage Learning,
2014), 379.
[20].
Sigmund Neumann, “The Rule of the Demagogue,”
American Sociological Review
3, no. 4 (August 1938): 487, accessed March 18, 2015,
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/stable/view/2083896.
[21].
Philippians 2:3-4 (NIV)