THE
IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE: POLITICAL PARTIES IN MIDDLE EASTERN NATIONS
Matt
White
November 3, 2015
Liberty University PPOG 640 – Middle East Laws and Policy
Political parties in the Middle East are frequently disbanded or created,
and new alliances and party coalitions are formed. The parties themselves are
not as geopolitically important as the greater struggles they represent, the
ideological battles that outlast the party. Ideological conflict along
ethno-cultural, secular and religious lines, and the political parties currently
leading the factions, are surveyed in the ethno-cultural conflict in secular
Israel, the Islamist struggle to regain power in currently secular Egypt,
Kurdish rights and the reintroduction of Islamic values in the Turkish
government against historic secularism and rising liberalism, and in the
cautious fight for reform against the conservative regime in the theocratic
Iranian state. The world generally characterizes a nation by the nature of these
ideological struggles and not by specific party names, but the actions and
attitudes of the predominant political parties on these greater battlefields can
influence world opinion and global standing.
Israel
The dominant political struggle in Israel is cultural, religious, and
ethic, centered on Jewish Israel against the interests of predominantly Muslim
Arabs. The world judges Israel in large part by the way the ruling Israeli party
treats Palestinians, which makes the attitudes and actions of the ruling party,
Likud, and of the Arab Knesset representatives of the Joint Arab List,
significant for Israel on the global stage.
The Knesset, Israel’s parliamentary assembly, consists of 120 members who are
elected through a proportional list system. Likud has been the ruling party
since 2009 with Benjamin Netanyahu serving his second stint as Prime Minister,
the first being from 1996-1999. In the 2015 election, Likud won 30 Knesset
seats, and retained the ability to form a coalition government. While the
coastal cities of Tel-Aviv and Haifa supported the liberal opposition, Likud
showed strong support in Jerusalem and throughout much of the countryside.[1]
Likud was founded in 1973 under the leadership of Menachem Begin, and first
gained control of the government in 1978. Free-market economic principles are at
the core of Likud’s philosophy. Under Begin’s leadership, Likud transformed a
previously socialist economy into a stable, market-driven economy which curbed
inflation.[2]
In addition to their platform of conservative market economic principles,
Likud’s defining ideology has been strong national defense, anti-terrorism, and
the promotion of the Jewish culture and Jewish nature of the State of Israel.
These defining ideologies have been reflected in Likud’s handling of the
Palestinian territories. Under Begin in 1980, the Knesset passed the
Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel,
which declared that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.”[3]
However, much of the world does not recognize Jerusalem’s capital status, as
Arab-dominated East Jerusalem was previously part of the West Bank territory
captured in the 1967 Six-Day War. Likud has an international reputation for
harsh and unfair treatment of Palestinian subjects and citizens through actions
such as building Jewish settlements in the West Bank, strong territorial border
enforcement, and police crackdown in their fight against domestic Muslim
terrorism. However, many Likud supporters, who live under the daily direct
threat of terrorism, see these measures not as extreme-right-wing, but as
realistic state security necessities, and many hold out for an eventual peaceful
two-state solution.[4]
A recent law increased the minimum threshold of the popular vote required for a
party to gain proportional representation in the Knesset from 2% to 3.25%. This
measure threatened to eliminate most all Arab representation in the Knesset. In
January 2015, four smaller Arab-dominated parties formed a coalition party that
submitted a single list for the March, 2015 election, calling themselves the
Joint List.[5]
Led by Masud Ganaim, the Joint List earned 13 seats with major support in
Arab-dominated cities,[6]
and became the Knesset’s third largest faction.[7]
Due to the nature of the coalition, Joint List members represent a wide variety
of policy platforms. Their only unanimous ideology is the protection of Arab
rights and the preservation of Arab representation in the Knesset,[8]
and in this, Joint List members have become quite vocal. On October 13, 2015,
all Joint List MKs visited the al-Aqsa Mosque in unified protest, despite
Netanyahu’s ban on lawmakers doing so, and demanded the lifting of recent
restrictions against Muslims entering the mosque.[9]
Egypt
The dominant ideological struggle in Egyptian politics is between
proponents of a theocratic Islamist state, represented by the Freedom and
Justice Party (FJP), recently banned from government participation, and the
stable secular government of President el-Sisi, backed by the For the Love of
Egypt Party. This clash has wider important across the greater Middle East, as
several nations are facing or have fallen under Islamist forces.
The Egyptian Parliament has been dissolved since June 14, 2012.[10]
However, Egypt is currently in the process of forming a new parliament, with
elections set to conclude December 2, 2015. The new parliament will contain 596
seats, 28 of which will be hand-picked by President el-Sisi, and 448 of which
will be filled through individual candidacies in local districts. The remaining
120 seats will be filled through a winner-take-all party list system. The party
with the highest popular vote among four regions will earn all 15 or 45 seats
from the respective region. The only party in the current elections that is
fielding a list in all four regions is the For the Love of Egypt party, and is
running uncontested in the East Delta region.[11]
For the Love of Egypt was formed in February, 2015 as a broad coalition
supporting el-Sisi and the direction of the current government. For the Love of
Egypt has diverse nationwide support, ranging from secular liberals to economic
conservatives. A secular party, their overriding ideology is centered on a
market economy and state security.[12]
For the Love of Egypt maintains broad appeal with their platform of securing a
safe, secular state, stemming from Egypt’s recent yet brief experience with an
Islamist government that subverted religious and political freedoms, and Egypt’s
current domestic threats of Islamist violence from the Muslim Brotherhood and
other terrorist organizations. Since he took power, el-Sisi has become one of
the most widely respected Arab leaders in the Middle East and across the globe.
Supporters view el-Sisi and his government as a stabilizing force, and as their
best chance to prevent another descent into Islamist chaos, unlike Syria, Iraq,
and Libya.[13]
The Freedom and Justice Party is an outlawed Islamist party, yet remains
a political force nonetheless. FJP, which has strong ties to the terrorist
Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, was formed in 2011 following the ousting of Hosni
Mubarak.[14]
The Islamist aims of FJP run directly counter to the secularism and
inclusiveness of the current government. El-Sisi’s predecessor, Mohamed Morsi,
represented the FJP until he was overthrown in 2013 following Morsi’s
declaration claiming ultimate power above the judiciary, constitution, and
popular will.[15]
Though the FJP is currently illegal and ineligible to field candidates in the
2015 elections, it is entirely plausible that FJP sympathizers of the Muslim
Brotherhood could be elected into one of the individual district seats without
having to declare party allegiance.
As an Islamist party, the overarching ideology, platform, and goals of
the FJP is the creation of a strong Islamic system of government. The Nour Party
is a rival Islamist party running in the 2015 elections, though they have
already lost one of the two divisions in which they had submitted a party list.[16]
Representing the Salafi brand of Islam, the Nour Party and the FJP have
fundamental differences in Islamist outlook, with the Salafis emphasizing the
elevation of the Islamic faith vs. the Islamic state. However, while the FJP was
in power, the two rival Islamic factions reached legislative compromises
concerning bans on blasphemy and the secularist’s attempt to legislate gender
equality.[17]
The legal Nour Party is more fundamentally religious than the FJP, whom they
viewed as religiously liberal. For instance, the constitution that was briefly
enacted under the FJP declared the sovereignty of the people, while the Salafis
insisted that all sovereignty belonged to Allah alone.[18]
Turkey
Turkey is in the midst of a political fight on both religious and ethnic
grounds. Under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Turkish
government is trending away from its historical secular Kemalism, focused on
Turkish nationality, to an increasingly religious government, focused on Muslim
identity. The secular and liberal People’s Democratic Party (HDP) has emerged as
an influential force, and a party that has defended Kurdish rights against
ethnic oppression under the AKP. Contemporary Middle Eastern conflict along
ethnic and religious lines has a driving significance for the Kurdish
population, without a national identity of their own, and whose population is
threatened by ISIS in Syria and Iraq. This places great regional and global
importance on the clash between the AKP and HDP.
The Grand National Assembly is the unicameral Turkish legislative body, elected
through party-list proportional representation. The AKP is currently in power,
regaining a majority of seats in the November 1, 2015 election, 316 of 550,
after losing their outright majority in the June, 2015 election.[19]
Both President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Davutoğlu represent the AKP. Founded
by Erdoğan in 2001, the defining ideology of the AKP is a unique form of
pro-Western, pro-EU democratic Islamism.[20]
The foundation of the AKP’s economic platform is the free market and limited
government economic intervention as the model that best ensures the freedom and
economic well-being of all citizens.
The official AKP platform promotes maintaining a secular government,
coexistent with an emphasis on strong Muslim values. The AKP Party Programme
states in its section on Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms, “Our party considers religion as one of the most
important institutions of humanity, and secularism as a pre-requisite of
democracy, and an assurance of the freedom of religion and conscience.”[21]
Erdoğan and Davutoğlu reject the Kemalist non-religious promotion of Turkish
nationality. As devout Muslims, their fundamental worldview is centered on
Islam, and they openly express their personal religious beliefs and promote the
resurgence of Islamic symbolism.[22]
Rather than Ataturk’s notion of secular Turkish nationalism, Erdoğan and
Davutoğlu nostalgically view the Ottoman Empire as the ideal of Muslim strength
and power, religious zeal and religious freedom for non-Muslims.[23]
Although the AKP nominally embraces democratic freedoms and liberal
democracy, critics argue that in practice, the AKP has ruled with authoritarian
tendencies. Countering the AKP is the HDP, founded in 2012. Ideologically, the
HDP is socially liberal, promoting their core values of egalitarianism,
environmentalism, women’s, minority, and LGBT rights. The HDP states that “The
capitalist system exploits and alienates the masses…” Additionally, the HDP
supports the notions of limited government, local autonomy, and direct
democracy.[24]
The HDP has earned recognition as the go-to intermediary in negotiations
between the ruling government and the Kurdish population.[25]
However, the party has been attacked for showing support for Kurdish rights,
most notably on October 10, 2015, when an HDP-supported Ankara peace rally was
bombed, resulting in 102 fatalities.[26]
HDP co-leader Selahattin Demirtaş placed blame on the AKP, claiming the
government was acting in cooperation with ISIS.[27]
The HDP won 80 seats in the June, 2015 election, preventing the AKP from
maintaining an outright majority, yet lost 21 seats in the November 1, 2015
election, barely meeting the 10% minimum threshold.[28]
While the AKP dominated the election throughout most Turkish provinces beyond
the Aegean coast, the HDP led in Kurdish-dominated regions in the southeastern
portion of the nation.[29]
HDP leaders blamed their losses on deliberate polarization tactics of the AKP by
associating the HDP as a pro-Kurdish party sympathetic towards the PKK, the
Kurdish terrorist organization.[30]
Iran
Conflict in the Iranian government is between the conservative
Principlists, aiming to preserve their Shi’a theocracy, and the Reformists,
aiming to introduce political freedom in Iran. Iran is a major force in the
Middle East, and by all accounts, has expressed nuclear ambition for either
domestic energy production or weaponization. Whether or not Iran will remain
supporters of terrorism, globally isolated and antagonistic under the
conservative regime, or reformed and open to international dialogue is of
extreme worldwide concern.
The Principlist Party has dominated the Islamic Consultative Assembly, or
Majlis, since the most recent legislative elections in 2012. Principlists are
not a single party, but a coalition of conservatives. The two main Principlist
factions, the Principlist Unity Front (PUF) and Preserving Front of the Islamic
Revolution (PFIR), represent 148 of the 290 seats in the Majlis, and are also
joined by independent Principlists.[31]
Principlists support the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, his
hardline theocratic authoritarian Shi’a Islamist government, and the principles
of the 1979 revolution.[32]
Conservative Principlists believe in the concept of
Wilayat al-Faqih, the designation of
a Shi’a political leader (Ayatollah) to act in place of the missing infallible
Twelfth Imam as a jurist and earthly guardian.[33]
Reformists do not form a traditional party, but rather are a diverse
group with aims of reforming and improving Iranian governance in practice
without necessarily rejecting the principles of the Iranian Revolution.[34]
Iranian Reformists seemingly faded into irrelevancy after winning only 20 seats
in the Majlis in 2012.[35]
However, many Reformists were suppressed and Reformist candidates banned from
running as a result of the failed 2009 Green Revolution,[36]
a reform movement supported by Iranian youth.[37]
After Ahmadinejad alienated himself from both the conservative government and
the populace through his international antagonism and domestic crackdowns,
current president Rouhani was elected in 2013 as a new hope for Reform. Rouhani
is a Reformist with a history of supporting the Ayatollah as a cleric, and has
earned the support of moderate conservatives and reformists alike.[38]
Former Reformist Iranian President Khatami stood for increased political
freedoms and repaired relations with the West.[39]
Rouhani has resumed Khatami’s Western outreach through the negotiations that led
to the pending nuclear deal.[40]
Conclusion
Middle Eastern political parties are fluid. Frequently, parties are
disbanded, new parties are created, and coalitions are formed. However, the
ideological divisions along ethnic, cultural, religious and secular lines within
a nation remain a constant at the center of the party struggle, regardless of
the name of the party representing their respective faction. In Israel, the
cultural and religious struggle between Jews and Arabs is politically manifested
by Likud and the Joint Arab List. In Turkey, the fight between secular, liberal
Kemalism vs. religious neo-Ottomanism is seen through the clash of the HDP and
AKP. The ideological battle between secular reform and theocratic Islamism is
seen in Egypt through the For the Love of Egypt party and the outlawed Freedom
and Justice party. The Iranian conflict between the Ayatollah’s old guard
theocracy and the push for political reforms and freedoms pits the Principlists
against the Reformists. The world looks in at these and other countries, and
associates the ideological struggles and the manner in which they are handled
with the nature of the regime and of the nation, affecting global standing and
international relations. The representative political parties of the moment are
less important than the ideological struggles themselves, which are
longer-lasting than the impermanency of Middle Eastern political parties and
coalitions.
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[1].
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[5].
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[6].
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[10].
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[13].
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[18].
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[19].
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[22].
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[24].
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[25].
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[26].
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