FOREIGN POLICY, COVERT INTELLIGENCE, AND THE AUTONOMOUS EXECUTIVE:

EISENHOWER AND THE U-2 FLIGHTS OVER SOVIET AIRSPACE

Matt White

May 4, 2015

Liberty University PPOG 624 – Presidential Leadership

Introduction

As the head of state and commander-in-chief, the president plays the leading role in the creation and conduct of foreign policy, but as a constitutional check against autonomous authority, foreign policy should be executed in partnership with Congress. In times of crisis and war, presidents should show swift, decisive, and prudent leadership independent of Congress in ensuring the national security. However, in times of peace, long-term programs that allow for committee deliberation must be met with congressional accountability, within the limits of the constitution, and it is the president’s role to lead Congress in the debate. The authorization and initiation of covert intelligence operations is one aspect that falls under the wide umbrella of foreign policy. As the example shows of Eisenhower’s authorization of U-2 program over Soviet airspace, unilaterally authorized covert operations could place national security at risk.

Constitutional and Philosophical Context

            The framers of the US Constitution established the presidency with the powers of head of state and commander-in-chief of the military. The president was granted the implied discretion to be able to act swiftly and effectively in repelling a sudden attack and in responding to national emergencies. Such actions could not wait on congressional deliberations. The concept has philosophic roots in those such as Montesquieu, who wrote, “When once an army is established, it ought not to depend immediately on the legislative, but on the executive power; and this from the very nature of the thing, its business consisting more in action than in deliberation.”[1] Yet, the founders made it very clear that the president was not to have absolute authority over the conduct of military and foreign affairs. As Hamilton pointed out in The Federalist 24, only Congress has the power of raising armies and of providing funding for executive military expenditures.[2] The president has discretion in the execution of war, but only Congress can declare war. Swift and decisive actions could be taken without Congressional approval, but over the longer term conduct, presidential discretion was meant to be held accountable and validated by congressional oversight. To do otherwise is a violation of the constitutional system of checks and balances.

            Covert intelligence operations are not necessarily unconstitutional, and can be vital to national security. During the Revolution, the Continental Congress directly initiated and authorized numerous covert operations. When Washington took office, he set precedent by continuing in his role as the head of national intelligence under the purview of commander-in-chief. Even in peacetime, Washington directly sought and gained congressional funding for various intelligence activities. Congress was kept informed of such activities without needing to know the compromising details.[3] However, as the following account shows, there is inherent danger and the potential abuse of power when the president authorizes intelligence agencies to conduct vast and risky operations while leaving Congress completely in the dark.

Creation of the U-2 Program

            Shortly after the start of the Cold War, the Air Force started to show an interest in the use of aerial and satellite reconnaissance in determining enemy capabilities. Lockheed Martin came across one such Air Force reconnaissance aircraft proposal and without official commission, the company assigned famed aircraft designer Kelly Johnson to initiate the design work. Johnson and his team designed a plane, originally dubbed the C-282, that could cruise above 70,000 feet, light enough to cruise at such altitudes, practically impossible to detect let alone shoot down, and capable of carrying 700 pounds of aerial reconnaissance equipment.[4] However, the Air Force rejected Lockheed’s proposal.[5]

Edwin Land, the founder of the Polaroid Corporation and a member of the Air Force advisory board that reviewed Lockheed’s proposal,[6] saw a major potential in proposed craft. Land became an advocate and strongly pushed for the CIA to pick up the C-282.  As an innovator of high tech photography, Land promised his company’s capability to deliver the required photographic equipment. CIA director Allen Dulles originally wanted nothing to do with the plane, and preferred to stick with traditional methods of espionage. [7] Dulles viewed entering the realm of high technology as a fundamental change in CIA operations. It was not a role Congress had authorized when they created the organization.[8] However, Land sold Eisenhower on the plane as a tool of the CIA with no military function.[9] It was renamed the U-2 in order to create confusion with a nontraditional designation. In total, 24 flights of the U-2 were conducted over Soviet territory between July 4, 1956, and May 1, 1960. The final flight was successfully shot down by the Soviet Union, and the CIA pilot, Gary Powers, was captured.[10]

Results of the Program and the Presidential Leadership Void

Eisenhower showed very little foreign policy leadership regarding the Soviet U-2 flights. He was unable to act as a leader in assuring a nervous public that their fears were unfounded. At the time, there was a nationwide fear of a growing “missile gap” between the United States and the Soviet Union. The general public assumed that the Soviets possessed superior missile capability, and Khrushchev perpetuated this notion with numerous false missile production claims. This missile gap fear influenced the results of the 1960 general election as Kennedy exploited this perception and claimed that Eisenhower was doing nothing about it.[11] Eisenhower understood the strategic need to know the Soviet Union’s military capability. As he stated in an address to the nation after the program was publically revealed, “No one wants another Pearl Harbor.”[12] In providing over a million feet of film that covered 15% of the Soviet Union’s surface, the U-2 was highly successful in showing that the Soviet Union was well behind the United States in missile production.[13] Still, Eisenhower did not wish to disclose the U-2’s findings out of fear of creating further tensions with the Soviet Union.[14]

Eisenhower was unable to influence Congress in reducing defense spending as a result of the U-2’s findings. Eisenhower was primarily wary of growing defense expenditures,[15] and could have used the U-2 findings for justification of reduced spending. However, without knowing the U-2’s findings, Congress authorized $42-52 billion annually on defense from 1953-1961, opposed to $9.1-13.7 billion from 1947-1951.[16] Thus, though the U-2 provided very useful intelligence in debunking the missile gap, by keeping it highly classified, that intelligence could not be used to positively affect policy or the national narrative.

            Despite his reservations about continuing the program, Eisenhower showed a lack of leadership in being swayed by undue influence from the CIA and from civilians such as Edwin Land. Eisenhower was aware of the risks the programs posed to US-Soviet relations. Eisenhower initially proposed an “Open Skies” policy to Khrushchev, in which each nation would be allowed to fly reconnaissance over the other. Khrushchev flatly rejected this notion, making it known that he wanted no such intrusions over Soviet airspace, yet Eisenhower went ahead with the covert U-2 flights regardless.[17] Eisenhower was wary about the flights, understanding the risks, yet instead of leading the CIA, he let the CIA lead him in authorizing their continuation. In his memoirs, Eisenhower noted that “I was the only principle who consistently expressed a conviction that if ever one of the planes fell into Soviet territory a wave of excitement mounting almost to panic would sweep the world, inspired by the standard Soviet claim of injustice, unfairness, aggression and ruthlessness.”[18] He admitted that if the Soviets were violating US airspace in like manner, he would be compelled to seek a declaration of war.[19]  

            Eisenhower’s fears of worsening already volatile relations with the Soviet Union were well-founded. The CIA thought the plane could fly undetected over Soviet territory, but in an intelligence failure, they underestimated Soviet advances in radar technology. The Soviets were able to track every U-2 flight.[20] The American public, as well as Congress, was kept in the dark, but the Kremlin was fully aware. Naturally, Khrushchev was insulted and this caused tangible harm to US-Soviet diplomatic relations. Khrushchev’s son, aeronautical engineer Sergei Khrushchev noted, “The U-2 flights, particularly that first flight, produced more than shock in the Soviet leadership. They had a profound influence on subsequent Soviet policy. In Father, they exacerbated a crisis of confidence in his negotiating partner and confirmed the idea that it was pointless to negotiate with the United States, because they only understood strength.”[21]

Constitutionality of the Soviet U-2 Flights

In authorizing the U-2 surveillance flights directly over the Soviet Union, Eisenhower exceeded his constitutional authority by completely excluding Congress and by exceeding the CIA’s legislative mandate. As stated, the president has discretion in the conduct of foreign policy, including covert action. But as the framers intended, presidential discretion is to be partnered with eventual Congressional statutory approval or at least implied consent. Congress was completely unaware of the existence of the U-2 program. Outside of those directly involved, only Eisenhower and three other officials in the White House were aware of the project.[22] The U-2 program was financed by a slush fund that Congress authorized Eisenhower to use for espionage. To ensure secrecy of such activities, Congress did not require any reporting on how this fund was used, but they assumed that it would be done within statutory bounds.[23] Congress established the CIA with the National Security Act of 1947, with the mandate to “collect intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means…”[24] It is doubtful, by Allen Dulles’s previously noted reaction, that Congress included the maintenance and operation of a fleet of high-tech aircraft as an “appropriate means” of intelligence gathering.  

Conclusion

            The proper scenario for the president to act without Congressional consent is when swift and decisive actions must be taken in times of emergency, to “provide for the common defense.”[25] Still, in such events, the president must eventually be held accountable to Congress and to the public. U-2 surveillance flights over Soviet airspace were not conducted in a time of crisis let alone a time of declared war. As a long term program, stretched out over four years, Eisenhower should have consulted congressional leadership. Specific congressional intelligence committees were created for such consultation and authorization, but not until 1975.[26] By authorizing a massive program without a hint of congressional knowledge, let alone oversight, Eisenhower’s unilateral actions were outside of the constitutional authority and the system of checks and balances. The assumption that the flights could go completely undetected and could not be shot down proved to be false. Congressmen could have questioned these assumptions and weighed in on the risks. Over the four year span of the U-2 flights over Soviet airspace, the intelligence collected showed the lack of a missile gap. However, this intelligence could not result in actionable policy in reducing military spending since it was kept classified. The American public and Congress were kept completely in the dark for four years, yet the Kremlin was well aware of the flights since the beginning. The flights only served to worsen US-Soviet relations and hence place national security at greater risk.

References

Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower: Soldier and President. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).

Cline, Ray S. “Covert Action as Presidential Prerogative.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 12, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 357-370. Accessed April 20, 2015. http://goo.gl/QoF1W9.

Greenstein, Fred I. The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama. 3^rd ed. Princeton: The Free Press, 2009.

Haines, Gerald K. “The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA: Looking for a Rogue Elephant.” Central Intelligence Agency. Updated June 27, 2008. Accessed April 21, 2015. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art07.html.

Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, John Jay. The Federalist. Orig. pub. 1788, 1818. Project Gutenburg compilation, 1992. Accessed April 20, 2015. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/abt_fedpapers.html

Janiewski, Dolores E. “Eisenhower’s Paradoxical Relationship with the “Military Industrial Complex.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 4 (December 2011): 667-692. Accessed April 21, 2015. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/doi/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2011.03909.x/abstract.

Khrushchev, Sergei. Nikita Khrushchev: And the Creation of a Superpower. Translated by Shirley Benson. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron. The Spirit of Laws. 1748. Reprint, Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2002.

Office of Management and Budget. “Historical Tables, Table 3.1-Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940-2020.” Accessed April 21, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/

Taubman, Philip. Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of America’s Space Espionage. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003.