“MORE CZARS THAN THE ROMANOVS”: A
REVIEW OF “THE PRESIDENT’S CZARS,” BY MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER AND MARK J. ROZELL
Matt White
March 30, 2015
Liberty University PPOG 624 – Presidential Leadership
Introduction
“In a system of government that seeks to prevent tyranny by ensuring each
branch can check the others, there are dangers in allowing executive branch
officials with far-reaching powers to be isolated from legislative oversight and
controls.”[1]
In The President’s Czars, Mitchel A.
Sollenberger and Mark J. Rozell provide a comprehensive non-partisan analysis of
the use of executive “czars,” and in doing so, they provide an effective and
eye-opening account of executive overreach that is threatening to the American
democratic system of checks and balances. Sollenberger and Rozell’s primary
purpose with The President’s Czars is
to highlight the rise of czars and executive power grabbing in order to raise
awareness among their readership concerning this phenomenon and to promote a
general demand that this practice be stopped.
Summary
Sollenberger and Rozell define a
true czar as an executively appointed official that has not been confirmed
by the Senate, yet performs duties with significant power and authority over
budgetary or regulatory matters that are binding to either the government or
private sector.[2]
They note three specific constitutional and legal principles that are violated
by the use of czars. The first is the Appointments Clause, found in Article II,
section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, which states that all officers
appointed by the president shall be confirmed with the “Advice and Consent” of
the Senate. When, without legislative confirmation or statue, a president
unilaterally appoints a czar vested with significant power, it is a direct
violation of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.[3]
The Non-Delegation Doctrine, found in Article I, section 1 (incorrectly
attributed in President’s Czars to
section 2), states that “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States,”[4]
and by implication, prohibits Congress from delegating legislative powers
outside its own body. A czar with regulatory and budgetary power can essentially
create the existence of legislation by executive fiat.[5]
When a president creates an office within the executive branch to be chaired by
a czar, and the office is not through congressional legislation, it is a
violation of the Legislative Establishment of Office principle that the Framers
implied throughout Article II.[6]
Further isolating themselves from congressional oversight, czars have claimed
executive privilege, as advisors to presidents, to refuse to testify before
Congress.
The majority of The President’s Czars is a simple chronology of the evolution of the
American czar, mainly highlighting the initial use and rapid expansion of czars
and executive overreach through specific 20th century presidencies.
The modern czar emerged with Woodrow Wilson, under whose administration the
power and scope of the executive branch vastly expanded, but often with
congressional consent. Congress passed the Overman Act, which gave Wilson legal
authority to consolidate and reorganize offices within the executive branch at
his discretion. Though the Overman Act did not allow Wilson to create agencies
at will, Wilson used the act as a legal cover for the creation of the War
Industries Board, among others.[7]
Without the threat of a world war, the subsequent string of Republican
presidents curtailed the use of czars and rolled back the power of the executive
branch to its proper scope.
Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency marked a major turning point in the
creation of the powerful modern presidency. Roosevelt created the Executive
Office of the President, which served to perpetually solidify the powers and
prominence of the executive branch.[8]
As the authors remark, “Roosevelt’s claim to such power to nullify the law at
will had never been asserted so boldly by a president. Even English monarchs had
been unable to exercise such authority since before the Glorious Revolution.”[9] In
response to the Great Depression, Roosevelt’s New Deal policies vastly expanded
the sphere of responsibilities undertaken by the executive branch, though mostly
with eventual legislative consent. Once the United States prepared to enter
World War II, Roosevelt used the excuse of executive war powers to create
offices and nominate czars in unprecedented number without legislative consent
or push-back.[10] With the
exception of Kennedy, presidents Truman through Johnson continued with
Roosevelt’s use of czars and with the centralization of executive power in
varying degrees.
Presidential power grabbing was rampant under Richard Nixon. Nixon
initially turned to his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, to formulate
foreign policy in a role legally ascribed to the Secretary of State. When
William Rogers, then Secretary of State resigned, Nixon appointed Kissinger to
the position, though he allowed Kissinger to serve in the dual role as National
Security Advisor.[11]
Nixon went so far as to devise a “super secretaries” plan, in which four
Senate-confirmed secretaries would be given czar power beyond their legally
sanctioned roles.[12]
In the aftermath of Watergate, both Presidents Carter and Ford sought to curtail
the executive abuse of power, and neither created any actual czars, only
media-appointed ones.[13]
Presidents Reagan through Clinton resumed the role of an assertive
executive, but generally did not actively create czars to accomplish this goal.
Reagan sought to reduce the size of government, and to do so, used methods such
as executive orders, executive privilege, and signing statements.[14]
George H.W. Bush governed through a strong cabinet.[15]
Clinton sought to assert his agenda through Congress.[16]
Under George W. Bush, the use of czars became rampant. After initially
promising otherwise, Obama vastly proliferated the practice of czars,[17]
so much so to cause Senator John McCain to quip that Obama has “more czars than
the Romanovs.”[18] The
practice became accepted by many in the public and with special interest groups,
because they saw it as a president who is attempting to tackle specific issues
of concern. The authors claim “…there was an expectation that the president
would take the lead in trying to rescue the country while it was in crisis.”[19] Of the 35
czar positions identified by the authors from Ford-Obama, eight were named under
Bush, and twenty under Obama.[20]
Sollenberger and Rozell conclude
The President’s Czars by outlining a general plan for restoring the proper
balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. This involves
overhauling Title 3, Section 105 of the US Code, which governs the pay of
employees within the White House Office.[21]
Critique
The President’s Czars is a
comprehensive look at the use of presidentially appointed czars throughout the
modern era, and is quite thorough in naming each official that is deemed a czar
per Sollenberger and Rozell’s definition. While the expansion of executive power
becomes readily apparent throughout their analysis, the focus is quite
quantitative in nature. While the abuse of executive authority through the use
of czars is clearly presented as an unconstitutional legal issue, the book is
lacking in the qualitative nature of how the ends do not justify the means, as
there are only a few empirical examples of significant harm that the use of
czars have imposed on the daily life of the general voting constituency.
While Sollenberger and Rozell
effectively highlight instances of executive abuse of the system of checks and
balances, they diminish the constitutional responsibility of the executive in
the legislative process and in holding Congress accountable. The executive was
not intended to be servile to the legislative branch, rather the two are
co-equal in the tripartite system. As Madison states in
The Federalist 47, “The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands…may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.”[22]
The President’s Czars superbly
overviews the executive accumulation of power in the modern presidency, but it
would be just as dangerous to democracy if Congress wielded supreme power in a
greater than co-equal status.
Aside from thoroughly highlighting the
unconstitutional use of czars, the primary strength of
The President’s Czars is its non-partisanship. The use of czars and
the abuse of executive power are thoroughly condemned throughout the book,
regardless of a president’s party affiliation. Bush and Nixon are criticized on
equal footing as Franklin Roosevelt and Obama. This is particularly poignant
since many contemporary pundits and politicians tend to defend or turn a blind
eye to the power-grabbing of a president of their own party affiliation in order
to preserve their own and their party’s interests. Then, in a hypocritical
fashion, the practice is condemned by the pundits only when it is done by a
president of another party.[23]
Sollenberger and Rozell’s proposed legislative reforms demand significant
regulation and congressional oversight of the pay and responsibilities of White
House and Executive Office employees. Though adding additional complex
regulation to government would usually result in a larger bureaucracy to work
through the red-tape, their proposal to statutorily limit the size could
ameliorate this. Their idea is a positive start, albeit a weak solution. It does
little to get to the root of the problem.
Personal Response
As John Marshall quoted in
Marbury v. Madison, “We are a nation of laws, and not of men.”[24]
This philosophy has roots dating back to the Magna Carta through the English
Constitution. Presidents are bound by the law, despite the acceptance of the
extra-legal practice of using czars. The acceptance of the view that presidents
are above the law is a direct affront to the democratic philosophy on which
American democracy was built. Many do not see this trend as a problem, rather,
czars could be a tool for efficiently addressing a specific issue of national
concern. However, the Framers created a system of limited government in order to
protect personal liberty and avoid the concentration of power within one
individual. Ruling by autocratic fiat may be an efficient way to govern the
nation, but it is in direct violation of the foundations of our democratic
system. The creation of czars, as astutely highlighted in
The President’s Czars, is just one symptom of demagoguery in
presidents who think that they are above the law.
When confronted by any personal issue,
too many people expect the government to swoop in and fix their lives for them.
It creates an environment where a giant government structure, led by a powerful
executive, is strongly desired, and fosters an environment where czars created
through executive overreach is the acceptable and expected norm. This atmosphere
is fertile for the rise of the demagogue, a leader who is able to rally the
masses, promising to deliver their every want and need, but motivated by a
selfish lust for power and a god-like ego. Not only does this exhibit a growing
lack of self-reliance among the populace, but also a lack of reliance on God.
Sigmund Neumann warned that when people lose their faith in God, they turn to
these demagogues as an alternate source of salvation.[25]
God could not have stated it more clearly: “You shall have no other gods before
me.”[26]
The power of Christ Jesus is “far above all rule and authority, power and
dominion…”[27]
and therefore forever above a power-hungry demagogue who tries to exceed the
legal authority God granted them by God’s higher power.
Conclusion
The President’s Czars
is a detailed, eye-opening, and
frightening account. The presidential
use of czars is an affront to the constitutional principles of the separation of
powers and of checks and balances established by the Framers. The emergence of
czars is a symptom of the characteristic modern presidency tending towards the
centralization of power within the executive branch and the belittling of the
congressional role in the democratic process. With Sollenberger and Rozell’s
non-partisan condemnation of the practice,
The President’s Czars will not alienate large segments of the political
spectrum, making it a must-read for all in order to raise a universal awareness
and condemnation of illegal executive power-grabbing through the use of czars.
References
Hamilton, Alexander, James
Madison, John Jay. The Federalist.
Orig. pub. 1788, 1818. Project Gutenburg compilation, 1992. Accessed March 28,
2015. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/abt_fedpapers.html
Neumann,
Sigmund. “The Rule of the Demagogue.”
American Sociological Review 3, no. 4 (August 1938).
487–498. Accessed March 18, 2015.
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/stable/view/2083896.
Sollenberger, Mitchel A. and Mark J. Rozell.
The President’s Czars: Undermining
Congress and the Constitution. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012.
[1].
Mitchel A. Sollenberger and Mark J. Rozell,
The President’s Czars: Undermining
Congress and the Constitution
(Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 2012), 6.
[2].
Ibid., 7
[3].
Ibid., 8-13
[4].
US Constitution, art.2, sec.2.
[5].
Mitchel A. Sollenberger and Mark J. Rozell,
The President’s Czars: Undermining
Congress and the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2012), 13-17.
[6].
Ibid., 17- 21
[7].
Ibid., 45
[8].
Mitchel A. Sollenberger and Mark J. Rozell,
The President’s Czars: Undermining
Congress and the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2012, 59
[9].
Ibid., 54
[10].
Ibid., 60
[11].
Ibid., 101-102
[12].
Ibid., 107-108
[13].
Ibid., 111-113
[14].
Mitchel A. Sollenberger and Mark J. Rozell,
The President’s Czars: Undermining
Congress and the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2012), 121
[15].
Ibid., 122
[16].
Ibid., 129
[17].
Ibid., 137
[18].
Ibid., 146
[19].
Ibid., 149
[20].
Ibid., 161
[21].
Ibid., 174
[22].
Hamilton, Alexander, James
Madison, John Jay, The Federalist,
orig. pub. 1788, 1818, Project Gutenburg compilation, 1992, accessed
March 28, 2015. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/abt_fedpapers.html
[23].
Mitchel A. Sollenberger and Mark J. Rozell,
The President’s Czars: Undermining
Congress and the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
173.
[24].
Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. 137 (1803).
[25].
Sigmund Neumann, “The Rule of the Demagogue,”
American Sociological Review
3, no. 4 (August 1938),
490, accessed March 18, 2015,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2083896?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
[26].
Exodus 20:3 (NIV)
[27].
Ephesians 1:21 (NIV)